Saturday, September 30, 2006

About Electronic Balloting...

Among several concerns about the Diebold electronic voting machines, the primary distress stems from lax security protocols within the machines’ software as well as the privatized implementation of these machines. Foremost, these machines are not considered secure because anyone who comes into contact with them can easily upload a malicious protocol into the system. As if this weren’t bad enough, if the infected memory card comes into contact with another machine, the virus/protocol is easily passed. Because there is no paper trail with this system, such an interaction is virtually unnoticeable and untraceable. In addition, many states have provided Diebold and other electronic voting companies free reign to implement these systems bypassing standard laws that require state and county approval throughout the process. Essentially, the privatization of elections is the greatest risk to electoral integrity.

If I were monitoring elections in California, I would primarily ensure that elections be conducted by public or not-for-profit entities to ensure just and unbiased election polling. The fact that the US is one of the only major world democracies that privatizes their elections is cause for alarm. High-level policy and organizational reform is necessary for the United States to attempt for elections. In addition, as archaic and environmentally unfriendly as it sounds, I think traditional paper ballots (you know, the kind that can be recounted and leave a trail), should be used until a more efficient form of electronic balloting is made. Citizens should have faith in their electoral reliability, something not guaranteed with electronic ballots.

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